University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 21
Number 2 Spring, 1991

Article 11

1991

Recent Developments: Mandel v. O'Hara:
Governor Enjoys Absolute Immunity Based on
Approval or Veto of Legislative Enactments
Lesley M. Brand

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Brand, Lesley M. (1991) "Recent Developments: Mandel v. O'Hara: Governor Enjoys Absolute Immunity Based on Approval or Veto
of Legislative Enactments," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 21 : No. 2 , Article 11.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol21/iss2/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

section 541(c)(2) did not encompass
the restrictions on alienation of plan
benefits in 29 U.S.c. § 1056( d)( 1).
Rather, the trustee argued that the term
referred "only to plans with transfer restrictions enforceable under state spendthrift trust law." Moore, 907 F.2d at
1477. The court of appeals rejected the
trustee's overly restrictive interpretation
of section 541 ( c ) (2) and held that the
term was not limited to state spendthrift
trust law. Id.
First, the court found nothing in the
plain language of section 541 ( c)( 2) to
suggest that the term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" refers exclusively to
state law. The court stated that the language means exactly what it says, thus
encompassing all laws, state and federal,
under which a restriction on transfer
can be enforced. Id
Furthermore, the court found that the
identical language in other provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code had been determined to apply to federal as well as state
law. For example, in In re Ahead By a
Length, Inc., lOO B.R 157 (Banke.,
S.D.N.Y. 1989), the bankruptcy court
found "applicable nonbankruptcy law"
within the provisions of 11 U.S.c.
§ 108( a) to include, inter alia, the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Act. The court thus concluded that
it would be "incongruous to give the
same phrase in Section 541(c)(2) a
narrower construction than the identical phrase other parts of the Bankruptcy
Code, particularly since the disparate
sections of the Bankruptcy Code were
enacted together in a single comprehensive statute." Moore, 907 F.2d at
1478. The court further concluded that,
had Congress intended the term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" to encompass only state law, it would have stated
so explicitly, as it had in other sections
oftheCode.Id. (citing 11 US.c. §522(b)
(1) & (2)).
Acknowledging the trustee's argument that several circuit courts have
determined the term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" in section 541(c)(2)
to refer only to state spendthrift trust
laws, the court distinguished those decisions as involving self-settled trusts
where the settlor was the beneficiary
and had powers to amend or terminate
the trust without penalty. Id In contrast,
the beneficiaries of the Springs Indus-

tries' plan could not control the trust,
could not borrow against it, and could
not amend the trust.
The court also rejected the trustee's
appeal to the legislative history of section 541(c)(2), finding such an approach inappropriate, since tl:te language
of the statute was clear. Id. at 1478-79.
Furthermore, the court noted that even
if a review of the legislative history were
relevant, it would be inconclusive. The
court found that Congress' repeated
emphasis on state spendthrift trust law
in the legislative reports accompanying
section 541(c)(2) indicated merely its
intentions to include state spendthrift
law within the restrictions of transfer
enforceable under "applicable nonbankruptcylaw." Id. at 1479. Thus,foundthe
court, Congress was treating interests in
plans containing valid spendthrift clauses
in the same way as prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, when such
interests were not property of the bankrupt's estate. Id. The court reiterated,
"[ n ]othing in the legislative history indicates ... that Congress meant 'applicable
nonbankruptcy law' to refer exclusively
to state spendthrift trust law." Id.
Having concluded that the term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" may include
federal law, the court went on to consider the issue of whether ERISA constitutes "applicable nonbankruptcy law"
so that the debtors' interests in the
ERISA-qualified plan were properly excluded from the estates under section
541(c)(2). The court found that the
primary purpose of ERISA was to secure
employees' retirement income so that a
worker promised a retirement benefit
would actually receive it. Id. ERISA
secures pension benefits primarily by
restricting the assignment and alienation of those benefits. Id. at 1480. Because these non-alienability provisions
deny general creditors, as well as plan
participants, access to vested benefits,
the court concluded that ERISA "constitutes 'applicable nonbankruptcy law'
under which restrictions on the transfer
of pension interests may be enforced."
Id. Thus, the court concluded, "'[u]nder
the plain and simple language of section
541 ( c)( 2), if the ERISA anti-alienation
provisions are enforceable against general creditors, they are enforceable
against the bankruptcy trustee. '" Id.

at 1478 (quotingIn re Threewitt, 24 B.R
927,929 (D. Kan. 1982)).
In finding ERISA to constitute applicable nonbankruptcy law within the
meaning of section 541(c)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
ensured that neither the vagaries of state
laws, nor the particularities of state
spendthrift trust law would continue to
threaten the security of employee retirement benefits, thus furthering ERISA's
purpose of uniform treatment of pension benefits across the country.
- MaryJo Murphy

Mandel tJ. O'Hara: GOVERNOR
ENJOYS ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
BASED ON APPROVAL OR VETO
OF LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS.
In Mandel v. O'Hara, 320 Md. 103,
576 A.2d 766 (1990), the Court of
Appeals of Maryland held that a governor could not be held liable for damages
in tort based upon his veto or approval
of legislation. The absolute immunity is
of the same type which members of the
General Assembly enjoy when voting for
or against legislative bills and applies
even if corrupt motives underlie the
exercise of power.
During 1971, Marlboro racetrack
made an agreement to buy eighteen racing days from another track which conducted horse racing with parimutuel
betting. The General Assembly approved
the transfer which subsequently was
vetoed by Governor Mandel. As a result,
James F. O'Hara, III and Michael P.
O'Hara sold their stock in Marlboro.
Thereafter, the General Assembly overrode the veto and Marlboro merged
with another entity that conducted horse
racing with parimutuel betting.
The O'Haras brought suit against the
governor and others, based on a theory
of conspiracy. They contended that by
vetoing the bill, Governor Mandel planned to depress the value of the Marlboro
stock, acquire the stock, then restore its
value by inducing the General Assembly
to override the veto. At trial, the governor's motion for su~ary judgment
based on absolute immunity was denied.
Governor Mandel appealed to the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland where he
was granted a stay. The court of appeals
granted certiorari before determination
on the merits to determine if a Governor
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of Maryland enjoyed absolute immunity
when vetoing or approving legislation.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
began its analysis by noting that it was
undisputed that some degree of public
official immunity applied to the governor when performing gubernatorial
duties involving the exercise of discretion. Mandel, 320 Md. at 107,576 A.2d
at 768. The question before the court
was whether such immunity was absolute or qualified. An absolute immunity
from tort liability, the court stated,
"stands even if the official acts in bad
faith, or with malice or corrupt motives,
and protects both judges and legislators,
so long as their acts are 'judicial' or legislative in nature." Id. (quoting Prosser &
Keeton, ]be Law of Torts, § 132, at 105657 (5th ed. 1984)). Governor Mandel
argued that his veto/approval function
was a legislative one, and therefore
should be protected to the same extent
as legislators.
Due to the lack of Maryland precedence regarding gubernatorial immunity specifically, the court based its
analysis on cases dealing with 42 US.C.
§1983, a statute which the court believed to be the driving force in the
development of public official immunity. Section 1983 allows suits against
public officials who have caused the
"deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws ... " 42 US.C. §1983 (1982).
The cases, as noted by the court of
appeals, took a "functional" approach to
immunity law in that '" [t ]he scope of
immunity is determined by function, not
office.'" Mandel at 120, 576A.2d at 774
(quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 us.
731,785 (1982) (White,].,dissenting)).
The court of appeals found that when
applied to cases dealing with executive
immunity, the functional approach produced disparate results. In Scheuer v.
Rhodes, for example, the Supreme Court
suggested that a governor would enjoy
qualified immunity for his deployment
of National Guard units. The Court analogized such action to possible arrest
situations confronted by police officers
whose actions are subject to good faith.
Mandel at 117, 576 A.2d at 772 (citing
Scheuerv. Rhodes, 416 US. 232 (1974)).
In contrast, the Court found in Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 US. 420 (1976) that a
state prosecutor's function of initiating

and presenting a case was covered by
absolute immunity since the discretion
involved was similar to that of a judge.
"Thus, '[a]lthough a qualified immunity
from damages liability should be the
general rule for executive officials[,] ...
there are some officials whose special
functions require a full exemption from
liabililty.'" Mandel, at 120, 576 A.2d at
774 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438
US. 478,508 (1978)).
When applying the functional approach to the facts sub judice, the court
of appeals found that the function of the
veto, '''as a matter of historical development as well as theory[,] ... [was] a
legislative power.'" Id. at 121-22, 576
A.2d at 775 (quoting E. Mason, The Veto
Power, 100 (A Hart. ed. 1967)). As
such, the exercise of gubernatorial veto
power requires that it is absolutely
immune from tort liability. Id. The court
explained that the act of deliberating on
the constitutionality, justice, and public
expediency of legislative measures before deciding whether or not to exercise veto power was "plainly the function of a legislator." Mandel at 122, 576
A.2d at 775 ( quoting People v. Bowmen,
21 N.Y. 517, 521-22 (1860)).
In support of its conclusion, the court
next cited Hernandez v. City of
Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (1982), in
which the United States Court ofAppeals
for the Fifth Circuit squarely held that
there is absolute legislative immunity
under §1983, which encompassed the
executive veto function. Mandel, at 12627,576 A.2d at 777-78. In Hernandez,
the court of appeals stated that '''[t]he
mayor's veto, like the veto of the President or a state governor, is undeniably a
part of the legislative process.'" Id.
(quoting Hernandez v. City ofLafayette,
643 F.2d at 1193-94 (1982)).
The court rejected the O'Haras' argument that the governor must be exercising the state's entire legislative power
on the subject at issue in order to assert
absolute immunity. The court did not
accept such language as a condition
precedent to absolute immunity, but
rather found that it could be asserted for
lesser delegations, such as the power to
veto.
By equating the governor's veto power
to a legislative function, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland specifically noted
that it was confining its holding to the

point of intersection of executive and
legislative powers. Therefore, although
a Governor of Maryland is an elected
official, he will nonetheless enjoy absolute immunity when exercising his constitutionally mandated power in a legiSlative capacity.
Mandel represents a Significant broadening of the immunity doctrine in an
area which had never been considered
in regard to the highest executive official of the state. Specifically, a Governor
of Maryland enjoys absolute immunity
when exercising the official function of
vetoing or approving legislation, regardless of the motives that may underlie the
function. This is in accord with the absolute immunity which the other branches
of government have long enjoyed. By so
ruling, the evidentiary problems that
would arise if a governor were held
accountable for every veto decision he
made were avoided. So too was avoided
the possible separation of powers problem that may occur if the judiciary was
empowered with the ability to judge the
acts of the executive when exercising
duties which he is constitutionally
bound to perform. The court's decision
permits such judgment to remain with
the governor's constituents, where it
belongs.
- Lesley M. Brand

Taxiera fl. Malkus: AFTER-BORN
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN HAVE
A RIGHT TO ESTABLISH
PATERNITY OF THEIR
DECEASED PUTATIVE FATHER
In Taxiera v. Malkus, 320 Md. 471,
578 A.2d 761 (1990), the Court of
Appeals of Maryland ruled that an illegitimate child born after her alleged father's
death has the right to establish the
paternity of her putative father. In so
holding, the court stated that such an
interpretation of Maryland's paternity
statutes conforms with the legislature'S
intentions of promoting the welfare and
best interests of children born out of
wedlock.
Elaine Taxiera, a Delaware resident,
filed suit in the Circuit Court for Dorchester County against Frederick Malkus, the Personal Representative of the
Estate of Levi Brown, Jr. Id. at 473, 578
A.2d at 762. She sought a declaration
under §1-208 of the Estates and Trusts
Article that Brown was the father of her
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